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Abstract 
In this paper we show how both the choice of specific constraints on input and output 
weights (in accordance with health care policy-makers’ preferences) and the consideration 
of exogenous variables outside the control of hospital management (and linked to past 
policy-makers’ decisions) can affect the measurement of hospital technical efficiency using 
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Considering these issues, the DEA method is 
applied to measure the efficiency of 85 (public and private) hospitals in Veneto, a Northern 
region of Italy. The empirical analysis allows us to verify the role of weight restrictions and 
of demand in measuring the efficiency of hospitals operating within a National Health 
Service (NHS). We find that the imposition of a lower bound on the virtual weight of acute 
care discharges weighted by case-mix (in order to consider policy-maker objectives) 
reduces average hospital efficiency. Moreover, we show that, in many cases, low efficiency 
scores are attributable to external factors, which are not fully controlled by the hospital 
management; especially for public hospitals low total efficiency scores can be mainly 
explained by past policy-makers’ decisions on the size of the hospitals or their role within 
the regional health care service. Finally, non-profit private hospitals exhibit a higher total 
inefficiency while both non-profit and for-profit hospitals are characterised by higher levels 
of scale inefficiency than public ones. 
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1. Introduction 
 In many countries, measuring the efficiency of health care services has 
become increasingly important since the early 1980s. In Italy, the complete 
devolution of the National Health Service (NHS) to regional governments, 
which started in 2001, and the definition of national basic levels of public 
health care to be provided by each regional health system has made it 
crucial to compare the relative performance of health care services both 
across different regions and across different Local Health Authorities (LHA) 
within each region. 
 In this paper, we will focus on measuring the technical efficiency of 
acute hospitals operating within NHS, which provide important services 
within the basic package of public health care. 
 The technical efficiency of hospitals can be measured by parametric and 
non-parametric evaluation methods that permit simultaneous comparison of 
the inputs and outputs of a hospital’s production process and produce 
concise indicators of efficiency. Both methods allow to consider the 
heterogeneous character of the output produced by different decision- 
making units (DMUs) and are particularly well-suited for developing 
indicators to compare the efficiency of different hospitals. Since each 
method is based on different hypotheses with differing degrees of 
stringency, they will lead to different (sometimes contrasting) results 
regarding the efficiency levels of the hospitals examined. Parametric 
analyses require a prior definition of a production function of hospital 
services, whereas the non-parametric analyses  determine the relative 
efficiency scores of similar DMUs by means of linear programming 
techniques, without detailed descriptions of their production processes.1 
 Given the multi-output nature of the hospital production process, we will 
focus on a particular non-parametric method, Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), which is encountering growing consensus as a powerful tool to 
measure hospital productivity because it allows the heterogeneity of 
                                                 
1 For a comparison between parametric and non-parametric methods, see: Banker, Conrad 
and Strauss (1986), Chirikos and Sear (2000), Jacobs (2001). 
  2
delivered outputs to be taken into account. As it uses a particular type of 
linear programming, DEA makes it possible to determine the relative 
efficiency levels of similar hospitals without the need for a detailed 
description of the production process (i.e. without determining beforehand a 
certain number of parameters in order to explain the structure of the whole 
production process)2. DEA is particularly useful when input prices are not 
available, thus making it impossible to estimate a hospital cost function. 
This is the case of most Italian NHS hospitals, whose costs are generally 
embedded in the Local Health Authorities’ costs and for which it would be 
unpracticable to assign a price to each used input. Moreover, DEA does not 
require a single objective function to be defined for all DMUs. On the 
contrary, DEA defines efficiency as the ratio between a weighted sum of 
outputs and a weighted sum of inputs and it allows each DMU to choose the 
preferred weights to attach to inputs and outputs in order to maximise its 
efficiency ratio with respect to the other DMUs. 
 As Allen et al. (1997) pointed out, the flexibility of DEA may be brought 
into question when it is considered that the correct evaluation of the relative 
efficiency of hospitals may require the consideration of value judgements 
which can restrict the acceptable ranges of variation of the input and output 
weights. These ranges can vary according to the perspective of the analysis. 
At one extreme, a hospital management perspective (hospital management’s 
maximum freedom when choosing the weights of inputs and outputs) can be 
adopted. At the other extreme, a complete centralised perspective can be 
adopted, in which individual input and output weights are not determined 
endogenously by the DEA method but defined univocally by a central 
policy maker; in this case, however, the DEA method loses its significance 
as the use of simple efficiency ratios would be sufficient. At an intermediate 
level, a constrained DEA model can be adopted in which a 
(national/regional) health authority sets the acceptable range of variations of 
                                                 
2 An extensive review of DEA applications in the area of health care is given by 
Hollingsworth, Dawson and Maniadakis (1999). For some recent interesting applications of 
DEA to hospital efficiency evaluation, see: O’Neill (1998), Puig-Junoy (2000), Steinmann 
and Zweifel (2003), Ventura, Gonzalez and Carcaba (2004). 
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the weights that each DMU can choose. In fact, since the outputs provided 
by hospital services are usually included in the basic levels of public health 
care, the evaluation of the relative efficiency of hospitals should take into 
account the policy-maker’s preferences. This implies imposing particular 
constraints on input and output weights. 
 Another issue that has often been neglected is the influence of variables 
outside the direct control of hospital management on hospital performance. 
In particular, we will show that the level of technical inefficiency observable 
using DEA can be broken down into internal inefficiency (attributable to 
hospital managers) and external inefficiency due both to an excess of supply 
with respect to demand and to scale inefficiencies. If these external 
inefficiency factors arise from past choices of health care planners, they 
should be considered exogenous with respect to the decisions of the hospital 
management. 
 In this paper, we show how both the choice of specific constraints on 
input and output weights (in accordance with health care policy-makers’ 
preferences) and the consideration of exogenous variables outside the 
control of hospital management (exogenous demand, past policy-makers’ 
decisions) can affect the measurement of hospital technical efficiency with 
DEA.  
 Subsequently, we develop four DEA models to measure the levels of 
technical efficiency of 85 acute hospitals in Veneto, a region in Northern 
Italy. The empirical analysis  allows us to evaluate the role of demand and 
weight restrictions and will provide some useful insights into the levels of 
efficiency of hospitals in the Veneto region (Northern Italy). 
 The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 briefly describes the 
main characteristics of DEA as a technique for measuring hospital technical 
efficiency. In section 3 we argue that precise value judgements are 
necessary in order to apply this method to the efficiency evaluation of 
hospitals operating within a National Health Service (NHS). These value 
judgements concern particularly production technology and managers’ or 
policy-makers’ preferences for hospital output mix and imply the adoption 
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of constraints on input and/or on output weights. In section 4 we analyse the 
importance of distinguishing between different components of the technical 
inefficiency of hospitals operating within an NHS: internal inefficiency 
attributable to the responsibility of hospital management and external 
inefficiency that could be due to past health care policy decisions and to 
exogenous demand. In section 5, the DEA method is applied to measure the 
levels of technical efficiency of the hospitals in Veneto. Finally, section 6 
reports some conclusions. 
 
2.  Measuring hospital technical efficiency with DEA 
 Detailed descriptions of DEA can be found in several sources (Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes 1978; Charnes et al. 1994; Ganley and Cubbin 1992; 
Cooper, Seiford and Tone 2000). Therefore, we provide here only a brief 
description of the basic constant return to scale model (CCR model from 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 1978). 
 Let’s consider J homogeneous hospitals (j = 1, … ,J) to be evaluated, 
each using varying quantities, xij, of I different inputs (I = 1, …,I) to produce 
varying quantities, ykj, of K different outputs (k = 1, … ,K). Defining ukj and 
vij the weights attached to the kth output and to the ith input, technical 
efficiency ej of hospital j can be written as: 
(1) ( )
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KjKjkjkjjjjj
jjjjj xvxvxvxv
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 Since the model can provide only relative efficiency scores, the hospital 
j’s efficiency ratio ej is defined as a percentage of the highest level of 
absolute technical efficiency attainable, where all the hospitals are assigned 
the weights chosen by hospital j in order to maximise its absolute efficiency. 
This is equivalent to attaching to outputs and inputs of hospital j those 
weights that cast its activity in the best light.  
 The relative efficiency of hospital j is calculated by solving the following 
mathematical linear programming problem: 
(2) ( )jjjjjvu vuxyejj ,,,max,  
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subject to constraints 
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 Constraints (3) set an upper limit equal to 1 for the efficiency indicators 
of all the hospitals calculated with the weights of hospital j. Constraints (4) 
impose the non-negativity of weights. Problem (2) can be solved in two 
ways: by minimising the quantities of inputs to obtain preset output levels 
(input-oriented model), or by maximising the quantities of outputs produced 
by given levels of inputs (output-oriented model). 
 The maximisation problem for hospital j is solved by finding the vectors 
of weights uj and vj that maximise the efficiency score ej. These are the best 
possible weights for the hospital as any other weight vector would lead to a 
lower efficiency indicator. If a combination of weights for which ej = 1 can 
be found, then hospital j will be efficient. On the other hand, if a value of ej 
< 1 were found, then hospital j would be inefficient. In the latter case, we 
can say that there are no weights uj and vj that could put hospital j at the top 
of the efficiency league of the hospitals examined. 
 This process is repeated to obtain the level of relative technical efficiency 
(efficiency score) and the “optimal” weights required to attain that level for 
each of the J hospitals. The optimal weights obviously differ from hospital 
to hospital. 
 The DEA weights provide particularly important information about the 
implicit choices made by each hospital in order to appear as efficient as 
possible in relation to the others. Making the weight attachment process 
endogenous can thus lead to different input and output weights depending 
on which hospital is considered. This is one of the strengths of DEA but, at 
the same time, it is also one of its weaknesses. It is a strength because if a 
given hospital is found to be inefficient even when the most favourable 
weights are applied for measuring its efficiency, then there are reasonable 
grounds to classify it as inefficient. In fact, despite the best weights being 
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selected to maximise its efficiency, a score ej < 1 indicates that a more 
efficient linear combination of other hospitals exists. It is a weakness 
because each hospital can obtain a high level of efficiency by choosing the 
most suitable weights. Hence the efficiency scores calculated for the various 
DMUs are not properly comparable as they derive from different weighting 
processes. In this way, however, outliers that focus on just one output 
(input) while neglecting the rest may appear to be fully efficient (O’Neill, 
1998). 
 
3. The need for value judgements and DEA weight restrictions 
 The great flexibility in selecting optimal weights is a particular feature of 
DEA and is often wrongly confused with absolute lack of a priori 
hypotheses on the form of the production function of DMUs but we should 
not ignore the fact that the acceptable range of weights can vary according 
to the perspective of analysis that is adopted. At one extreme, a hospital 
management perspective can be adopted, that is, maximum freedom when 
choosing weights3. At the other extreme, a complete centralised perspective 
can be adopted in which input and output weights are determined 
univocally. In this case, however, the DEA loses its significance as it is 
reduced to the traditional type of analysis where each hospital’s efficiency is 
measured as the ratio between weighted aggregations of selected outputs 
and inputs. At an intermediate level the relevant authority (e.g. a national or 
regional health care authority within an NHS) can set maximum and 
minimum boundaries for some or for all the weights. In this case, a 
constrained DEA model is applied according to the targets of the policy-
maker.4  Since many hospital services are considered of great social value, it 
is inevitable that to some extent the evaluations of relative efficiency of 
hospitals will be conditioned by value judgements. 
                                                 
3 However, a value judgement is implicitly formulated as the implicit weights chosen by 
each hospital are considered acceptable. 
4 Allen et al. (1997) calls the single hospital perspective a “bottom up” approach and the 
policy-maker perspective a “top down” approach. 
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 Following Allen et al. (1997), value judgements concerning the relative 
importance of inputs and outputs can be incorporated in the CCR model, via 
weight restrictions, according to three broad approaches having different 
implications on the assessed relative efficiency of hospitals: 
1) imposing direct restrictions on the weights of some or all inputs and 
outputs. This approach can be applied in two ways: 
i) absolute weight restrictions, by imposing lower and upper bounds to 
weights; 
ii) assurance region methods, which impose constraints on the marginal 
rates of substitution between inputs or outputs (defined by the ratio 
between input or output weights); 
2) adjusting the observed input-output levels (cone-ratio approaches); 
3) restricting the virtual weights of inputs and/or outputs. For example, the 
virtual weight for output k of hospital j - which defines the proportion of the 
total virtual output of DMU j devoted to output k, and is expressed  as 
( ) ( )∑ =Kk kjkjkjkj yuyu 1  - could be restricted within a given range.5 
 The bounds used in weight restrictions can be either exogenously set 
according to policy-maker (or top management) objectives, expert opinion 
and price/cost information (where available) or endogenously derived from 
the data. In the latter case, running an unbounded DEA at the first stage 
could provide useful information for definition of the weight restrictions to 
use in the constrained DEA at the second stage.6  
 In the empirical analysis of section 5, we will use a restriction on output 
virtual weights. This choice allows us to take into account the contribution 
of output levels to hospital technical efficiency. 
 It is useful to explore the effect of restriction on output virtual weights by 
using a simple example in which two outputs y1 (acute care admissions) and 
                                                 
5 See Pedraja-Chaparro, Salinas-Jimenez and Smith (1997), Charnes et al. (1994) and 
Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000) for further reading on the role and implications of weight 
restrictions in DEA. 
6 For example, Chilingerian and Sherman (1997) obtained optimal weights for inputs and 
outputs of primary care physicians with an unbounded DEA, at the first stage, and then 
used these weights to define a cone-ratio in a subsequent bounded DEA model based on 
HMO management’s objectives. 
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y2 (day hospital treatments) are considered. The marginal rate of technical 
transformation between the two outputs, for a given level of efficiency, is 
the ratio jj uu 21 /− , which is the slope of the indifference curves in the 
output space (see fig. 1). 
 Let’s consider a constraint on virtual weights represented by a lower 
bound α  imposed on the relative value judgement assigned to output y1: 
(5) α≥+ jjjj
jj
yuyu
yu
2211
11  
with 10 ≤≤ α . Solving this constraint for jy2  yields the associated 
assurance region: 
(6) j
j
j
j yu
u
y 1
2
1
2
1
α
α−≤  
where 
j
j
u
u
2
11
α
α−  represents the slope of the line defining the boundary of 
the assurance region in the output space (fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1 - Constraint on virtual weights: the effect of an increase in the 
marginal rate of technical transformation on the assurance region 
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 It is well known (Wong and Beasley 1990, Pedraja-Chaparro, Salinas-
Jimenez and Smith 1997, Allen et al. 1997) that, when a constraint is 
applied to virtual weights, both the marginal rate of transformation and the 
assurance region are DMU-specific because they depend upon the DMU’s 
choice of the absolute weights. 
 As is shown in fig. 1(a), for a given value of α , the DMU B is efficient 
also with the constrained DEA because its virtual weights satisfy condition 
(6) even in the unconstrained DEA model. Fig. 1(a) shows the assurance 
region chosen by B, which is compatible with the ratio between its best 
absolute weights BB uu 21 / . On the contrary, the DMU represented by point 
C in Fig. 1(b), which would be efficient according to the unconstrained 
DEA, is now inefficient and its inefficiency is measured by CC'. The DMU 
C chooses its absolute weights by increasing the ratio CC uu 21 /  in order to 
belong to a larger assurance region (with respect to B). As a consequence, 
the slope of the indifference curve also increases and this determines the 
inefficiency score measured by CC’. 
 To summarise, constraints on virtual weights seem to be less binding 
than constraints on absolute weights. In fact, the latter determine a unique 
assurance region for all DMUs, while the former allow DMUs to choose the 
absolute weights that guarantee their best assurance region. 
 
4. The role of demand and of scale efficiency in the performance of 
NHS hospitals 
 If the set of hospitals under examination includes units with excess 
supply with respect to demand, then the analysis of efficiency should 
capture this effect. In an NHS, an excess supply of hospital services could 
be due to past decisions of health care policy-makers, determining over-
sizing of capacity with respect to actual demand with a negative influence 
on DEA efficiency scores. This particular source of inefficiency can be 
defined as demand inefficiency. Moreover, if we consider the hospitals 
operating within an NHS (which make their decisions according to national 
and regional health care authorities’ guidelines), health care policy-makers 
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could also be responsible, at least partly, for another source of inefficiency, 
i.e. scale inefficiency, arising from over- or under-sizing of hospitals with 
respect to their actual activity levels. 
 Both these sources of inefficiency can exist in the short term and can be 
considered, somehow, “external” to NHS hospitals’ management 
responsibility, being determined in most cases by the decisions of health 
care planners. In fact, within an NHS, a hospital could be kept active for 
reasons regarding broader health care policy, even if it exhibits a non-
optimal bed capacity, high levels of potential production and insufficient 
demand.7 In this case, an NHS hospital could operate efficiently given the 
actual demand for its services (internal technical efficiency), but at the same 
time it could show external technical inefficiency (both scale and demand 
inefficiency), as its size is non-optimal and its input endowments are 
excessive in relation to actual demand. While the external inefficiency of 
public NHS hospitals can be due to decisions taken by national and regional 
policy-makers at a higher level than hospital management, private hospitals 
(for-profit and non-profit) operating within an NHS could be publicly 
subsidized in order to operate with a given (non-optimal) capacity and in a 
given (low demand) area. In both cases, scale inefficiency and demand 
inefficiency can be attributed to the responsibility of policy-makers and are 
therefore external to the hospital management. 
 The point can be further explained with the help of fig. 2, where we 
consider a very simple production process (one output y, acute care 
admissions, obtained via the utilization of one input x, the number of beds). 
In fig. 2 we show the frontier production function (FPF) for a given set of 
hospitals, describing the higher level of output y attainable via an efficient 
utilization of input x, and the observed production function (OPFj) of a 
given hospital j.8 In the example of fig. 2, we consider the existence of an 
expressed admissions demand yL which is always lower than the number of 
                                                 
7 For example, consider hospitals in poorly-served areas - such as islands, mountainous 
districts and other peripheral and low population density areas - which, if closed, would 
force people to travel long distances or face long waiting lists. 
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admissions that can be satisfied by the hospital, considering its OPFj. We 
can distinguish between two cases: a) the hospital’s bed capacity is optimal 
(xj=x*; fig. 2(a)); b) the hospital’s bed capacity is above its optimal size 
(xj>x*; fig. 2(b))9. 
In case a), total inefficiency can be split into two components: internal 
inefficiency (the distance between FPF and OPFj, i.e. y*(x*)- yj(x*)), and 
demand inefficiency (the distance between OPFj  and the line yL, i.e. yj(x*)-
yL). In this case, by definition, there is no scale inefficiency (as xj=x*) and 
the hospital is inefficient because its output is lower than the maximum 
level attainable with the quantity of input x* (i.e., yj(x*)< y*(x*) - internal 
inefficiency), and also because its supply of in-patient care is higher than the 
expressed demand (yj(x*)>yL).10 
In case b), total inefficiency can be split into three components: 
 scale inefficiency (the distance between the dotted line OM, linking 
the origin to point M that defines the optimal output with respect to 
actual capacity xj, and the FPF, i.e. yM(xj)- yF(xj)); 
 internal inefficiency (the distance between FPF and OPFj, i.e. yF(xj)- 
yj(xj)); 
 and demand inefficiency (the distance between OPFj  and the line yL, 
i.e. yj(xj)-yL). 
 Therefore, unless hospital size is optimally chosen, it is always possible 
to identify three different components of inefficiency: internal inefficiency; 
scale inefficiency; and demand inefficiency. As previously said, if we 
consider hospitals operating within an NHS, the latter two components of 
inefficiency can be considered as external source of inefficiency because 
they are, at least in the short run, outside the control of hospital 
management. 
                                                                                                                            
8 Fig. 2 is used here just for explanatory purposes, while in the DEA the production frontier 
would be represented by a piecewise line. 
9 We do not consider a third case in which the hospital’s bed capacity is under its optimal 
level. 
10 If the level of expressed demand of in-patient care were higher than yj(x*) (e.g. the 
dotted straight line yLL in fig. 2(a)), hospital j would exhibit only internal inefficiency MN, 
while we could not observe the gap between expressed demand and satisfied demand LN. 
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Fig. 2a Components of hospital total inefficiency with optimal bed 
capacity 
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Fig. 2b Components of hospital total inefficiency with capacity above 
the optimal level 
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 Using DEA, it is possible to provide evidence of both sources of external 
inefficiency. External scale inefficiency (due to a non-optimal hospital size) 
can be measured by introducing the assumption of variable returns to scale 
(VRS), as in the BCC model (Banker, Charnes and Cooper 1984). On the 
other hand, measuring external demand inefficiency (due to a shortage of 
actual demand with respect to supply) should take account of the existence 
of an additional constraint on the demand side. This can be done by adding 
to the BCC-DEA model a non-discretionary demand variable (that proxies 
the actual demand level) among inputs, i.e. an exogenous demand variable 
that cannot be modified at the discretion of individual hospital managers, 
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such as yL in fig. 2. The consideration of an additional exogenous demand 
input in BCC-DEA can be made following Cooper-Seiford-Tone’s approach 
to the treatment of a non-controllable (NCN) variable (Cooper, Seiford and 
Tone, 2000, chapter 7). Obviously, considering an additional input will tend 
to increase the number of efficient hospitals. This happens because low 
efficiency scores are now attributable to external variables beyond the 
control of hospital managers. 
 In order to measure demand inefficiency, we should consider a demand 
variable completely exogenous with respect to hospital management 
decisions. A good example of such a variable seems to be the potential 
demand of admissions for each hospital measured either by past 
hospitalisation rates or by a good estimation of the number of in-patients 
within the hospital’s catchment area. Unfortunately these data are very often 
not available (as in our case) so the non-discretionary demand variable 
could be proxied either by the hospitalisation rate or by the number of 
residents in the Local Health Authority area where the hospital is located. 
However, the choice of these non-discretionary variables does not appear 
appropriate for several reasons. Firstly, hospitals are “point-services” whose 
demand cannot be easily circumscribed to a specific area (even though the 
higher percentage of admissions refers to residents within a particular LHA 
boundary). Secondly, since more than one hospital operates within the 
territory of a given LHA, it is difficult to share residential LHA demand 
between each hospital. 
 To overcome these problems, a possible choice (that we adopt in the next 
section) could be to approximate the non-discretionary level of demand yL 
by considering the actual number of hospital admissions. This is clearly an 
unsatisfactory choice, since the satisfied admissions demand is undoubtedly 
influenced by the hospital’s production process. In any case, it should be 
noted that the number of admissions (satisfied demand) cannot be larger 
than the expressed demand and that both are lower than the actual (latent) 
admissions demand. Therefore, if - after including in the BCC-DEA model 
the number of admissions among the inputs (as a non- discretionary 
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variable) - we do not find any demand inefficiency, this can be surely 
considered a robust result. 
 Summing up, by using the assumption of VRS (with a BCC-DEA) and 
then including an NCN demand variable, it is possible to distinguish 
between: 
• total technical efficiency with VRS:  Sje ; 
• internal technical efficiency with VRS, Ije , which signals the ability of 
the hospital management to apply the most efficient production 
technique. 
Therefore, the total inefficiency of a hospital j (1-ej) can be considered as 
the result of three components11: 
• internal inefficiency due only to hospital management, computed as (1-
I
je ); 
• external scale inefficiency, computed as the difference between total 
efficiency with VRS and total efficiency with CRS: ( Sje -ej); 
• external demand inefficiency, computed as the difference between 
internal efficiency with VRS and total efficiency with VRS: ( Ije -
S
je ). 
 
5. A case study: the hospitals of the Veneto Region - Italy 
5.1. The model 
 Let’s examine the effect of what we have discussed so far using data 
concerning the acute hospitals in Veneto, a region in Northern Italy. The 
hospital technology is described by a simplified model with three outputs: 
an index of in-patient output calculated by weighting the number of acute 
care discharges with DRG weights (y1); the number of days of treatment in 
day hospital (y2); the number of treatments provided by emergency services 
(y3), and five inputs: the number of physicians (x1); the number of nurses 
                                                 
11 The three different components of inefficiency can be measured by comparing the scores 
obtained with three different DEA models: the CCR model; the BCC model; the Non-
Controllable Variable BCC model. See Cooper et al. (2000). In section 5, we will adopt this 
methodology. 
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(x2); the number of other employees (x3); the number of hospital beds (x4); 
the total number of acute care admissions as an additional input used as a 
proxy for hospital demand (x5). 
 Output y1 is built as a weighted sum of medical and surgical discharges 
differentiated by DRG (excluding day hospital cases). As aggregation 
weights, we use the relative standard costs (DRG tariffs) attached to each 
DRG, considered as proxies of the intensity of care embodied in each 
discharge classified in that DRG.12 Output y2 is given by the number of days 
of treatment provided by medical and surgical day-hospital services. Output 
y3 is the number of treatments provided by accident and emergency services. 
 The staff numbers (x1, x2, and x3) are measured as the average number of 
full-time equivalent staff for the year, while the number of beds (x4) is a 
proxy of the capital used in the hospital production process. Finally, the 
additional input x5 represents a non-controllable demand variable introduced 
in order to separate total technical efficiency into its internal (managerial) 
and external components, according to the analysis in section 4. 
 We consider four different DEA models reported in Table 113. 
 
                                                 
12 The DRG classification includes 492 categories, as in the 10th version of HCFA-DRG in 
the U.S. 
13 In model 2, the restriction on the virtual weights of output y1 (acute care discharges 
adjusted with DRG) implies that each hospital cannot attribute a virtual weight lower than 
70% to output y1. The particular choice of the lower bound of 70% can be justified by two 
different arguments. Firstly, the output virtual weights that can be chosen by each hospital 
should not be too far from the virtual weight chosen by a DMU built as the aggregate of the 
Veneto hospitals under evaluation (“Veneto” DMU) that can be interpreted as an implicit 
expression of the Veneto Region’s preferences concerning the relative importance of 
different outputs. The average virtual weight of output y1, calculated for Veneto DMU in 
model 1, is 86%. Secondly, it should be noted that the more recent health care policy of the 
Veneto Region gives incentives to shift hospital production from traditional forms of in-
patient care towards day hospital and emergency treatment. Consequently, the virtual 
weights of y1 should be lower than 86% in order to guarantee that each hospital does not 
overlook other outputs. 
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Table 1 – The analysed DEA models 
Model Orien- tation 
Return to 
scale 
Technical 
 efficiency Constraints 
Responsibility for 
technical inefficiency 
1 (CCR) 
 
Input 
Output(*) 
Constant 
(CRS) 
Total None Hospital management 
and Policy-maker 
2 (CCR) Output Constant 
(CRS) 
Total Virtual 
weight of 
output y1 ≥ 
70% 
 
Hospital management 
and Policy-maker 
3 (BCC) Input Variable 
(VRS) 
Total None Hospital management 
and Policy-maker 
4 
(BCC  
-NCN) 
Input Variable 
(VRS) 
Internal  
(addition of 
 input x5) 
None Hospital management 
(*) Results obtained either with input-oriented or output-oriented CCR model are 
equivalent. 
Key: 
1. CCR model: Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978 
2. BCC model: Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984 
3. BCC-NCN model: BCC model modified with a non-controllable (NCN) variable 
(Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2000, chapter 7) 
 
5.2 The data 
 The data used for the analysis refer to the year 1997 and come from the 
hospital discharge records of the Ministry of Health and the Veneto Region 
databases (Regione Veneto, 1999). Due to the lack of some information, the 
sample does not include all the Region’s public and private hospitals. Only 
85 structures are considered out of the 95 that actually existed. The sample 
consists of 59 LHA-public hospitals (i.e. hospitals directly run by Local 
Health Authorities), 2 public hospital trusts (the teaching hospitals of Padua 
and Verona) and 24 private hospitals affiliated to LHAs (seven of which are 
non-profit). As far as outputs y1 and y2 are concerned, the revenues of 
hospital trusts and private hospitals are based upon DRG tariffs, while 
LHA-public hospitals are financed partly on a capitation basis (considering 
the needs of the population residing within each Local Health Authority’s 
territory) and partly by DRG tariffs (in order to compensate the services 
provided to patients residing outside the LHA). For all hospitals, on the 
other hand, emergency services y3 are compensated by special funds on a 
retrospective basis. 
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5.3 Results and discussion 
 In model 1 (CRS total efficiency without constraints) most hospitals 
exhibit a very high virtual weight for output y1 “discharges adjusted with 
DRG”. In any case, as no constraints are imposed, it is possible to retrace 
some hospitals which exhibit a very low (or nil) virtual weight for y1, while 
assigning a very high virtual weight to the number of days in day hospital y2 
or to emergency services y3. This is plainly unsatisfactory, as discharges are 
an important component of total hospital output. Therefore, in model 2 
(CRS total efficiency with a constraint on y1 virtual weights) we try to 
overcome this shortcoming by imposing a constraint on the virtual weights 
of hospital output y1. 
Table 2 shows that, after the introduction of the constraint on y1 virtual 
weight, on average, total efficiency decreases from 74.5% (model 1) to 
71.3% (model 2). The restriction penalises the DMUs that in model 1 
assigned a virtual weight of less than 70% to acute care discharges. Table 2 
shows this effect: 25 hospitals that in the unbounded DEA (model 1) 
exhibited high performances have very low efficiency scores in model 2. 
Two cases that stand out are the LHA-public hospitals U07 and U21, which 
give absolute priority to day-hospital care (with weights close to 100% in 
model 1), and which drop from total efficiency scores of 100% to 48.4% 
and 71.2% respectively. 
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Table 2 – The effect of a constraint on y1virtual weights (subset of 
hospitals affected by the constraint on virtual weights; scores in % 
ranked by total efficiency level) 
Hospital 
Total efficiency 
with CRS 
(model 1) 
Constrained total 
efficiency with 
CRS 
(model 2) 
Reduction of 
efficiency due to 
restrictions on y1 
weight 
(mod. 2 - mod.1) 
U68 44.6 23.7 -21.0 
U25 50.6 49.4 -1.3 
U54 53.2 51.8 -1.4 
U20 57.2 35.0 -22.2 
U29 58.6 40.0 -18.6 
U75 59.6 47.7 -11.9 
U40 69.8 60.9 -8.8 
U41 71.3 71.2 -0.2 
U44 76.0 69.9 -6.1 
U10 81.3 68.3 -13.0 
U27 83.8 71.1 -12.7 
U31 86.9 85.6 -1.3 
U51 87.3 86.7 -0.5 
U32 89.9 88.5 -1.4 
U26 93.6 90.9 -2.6 
U50 94.5 90.0 -4.5 
U06 95.6 71.9 -23.7 
U78 95.6 81.0 -14.7 
U66 95.8 86.2 -9.6 
U24 97.3 96.5 -0.8 
U76 98.6 98.4 -0.3 
U90 99.2 92.4 -6.8 
U67 99.7 98.2 -1.5 
U07 100.0 48.4 -51.6 
U21 100.0 71.2 -28.8 
 
number of full efficient DMUs 13 11 -2 
Average 74.5 71.3 -3.1 
Minimum 15.6 15.6 -51.6 
Maximum 100.0 100.0 - 
Range 84.4 84.4 51.6 
Standard deviation 22.8 23.1 8.0 
 
 Table 3 compares the main results from model 1, model 3 (VRS total 
efficiency without constraints) and model 4 (VRS internal efficiency 
without constraints). The table shows the data for the 72 hospitals that 
change (increase) their efficiency scores moving from model 1 to model 3 
(among these DMUs, 51 increase their scores moving from model 3 to 
model 4). The total efficiency scores of model 3 are obtained running a 
BCC-DEA. Internal efficiency scores of model 4 are obtained by including 
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among the inputs in the BCC-DEA a non-controllable demand variable, the 
total number of admissions x5.14  
 
 
Table 3 – Scale and demand effects on hospital efficiency scores 
(a selection of hospitals changing their efficiency scores moving from model 1 to models 3 
and 4, ranked by total efficiency level; efficiency scores in %) 
DMU 
Total 
efficiency  
with CRS 
ej 
(model 1) 
Total 
efficiency 
with VRS 
eSj 
(model 3) 
Internal 
efficiency 
with VRS 
eIj 
(model 4)
Scale 
inefficiency 
(eSj- ej) 
(I) 
Demand 
inefficiency 
(eIj- eSj) 
(II) 
External 
inefficiency
(eIj- ej) 
(III=I+II)
Internal 
inefficiency 
(1- eIj) 
(IV) 
Total 
inefficiency 
(1- ej) 
(V=III+IV) 
U83 15.6 100.0 100.0 84.4 0.0 84.4 0.0 84.4 
U70 19.9 54.9 55.1 35.0 0.1 35.2 44.9 80.1 
U62 24.5 67.2 80.2 42.8 12.9 55.7 19.8 75.5 
U13 26.8 80.3 84.6 53.5 4.2 57.7 15.4 73.2 
U69 31.7 47.7 49.0 16.0 1.3 17.3 51.0 68.3 
U61 34.6 37.5 37.8 2.9 0.3 3.2 62.2 65.4 
U85 35.4 70.1 70.7 34.6 0.6 35.3 29.3 64.6 
U38 37.3 75.0 100.0 37.7 25.0 62.7 0.0 62.7 
U72 40.2 43.1 49.3 2.9 6.2 9.1 50.7 59.8 
U42 41.9 100.0 100.0 58.1 0.0 58.1 0.0 58.1 
U68 44.6 45.5 100.0 0.9 54.5 55.4 0.0 55.4 
… … … … … … … … … 
U06 95.6 100.0 100.0 4.4 0.0 4.4 0.0 4.4 
U78 95.6 96.1 100.0 0.4 3.9 4.4 0.0 4.4 
U66 95.8 100.0 100.0 4.2 0.0 4.2 0.0 4.2 
U24 97.3 100.0 100.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 
U56 98.1 100.0 100.0 1.9 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.9 
U80 98.5 100.0 100.0 1.5 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.5 
U76 98.6 100.0 100.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 
U90 99.2 100.0 100.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 
U74 99.6 100.0 100.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 
U67 99.7 99.9 100.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 
Number of efficient DMUs 
 13 33 47      
Average 
 74.5 86.3 90.8 11.8 4.5 16.3 9.2 25.5 
Minimum 
 15.6 37.5 37.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 84.4 54.5 84.4 62.2 84.4 
Range 
 84.4 62.5 62.2 84.4 54.5 84.4 62.2 84.4 
Standard deviation 
 22.8 16.6 14.8 16.6 9.0 18.7 14.8 22.8 
 
                                                 
14 Assuming VRS and being able to use an extra non-controllable variable obviously leads 
to efficiency scores that are higher than (or equal to) those obtained for total efficiency. In 
model 1, only 13 hospitals (15.29% of the total) are efficient, while 14 have an efficiency 
score lower than 50%. In model 3, 33 hospitals (38.82% of the total) are efficient and four 
exhibit a score below 50%. In model 4, 47 hospitals (55.29% of the total) are efficient and 
three exhibit a score below 50%. 
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 Under the assumption of VRS (model 3), we find increasing returns to 
scale (IRS) for 42 hospitals and decreasing returns to scale (DRS) for 23, 
while 20 hospitals demonstrate constant returns to scale (CRS) (seven of 
these hospitals increase their efficiency). Generally, IRS are linked to lower 
(sometimes very low) total efficiency scores, while DRS are linked to 
higher total efficiency scores. The existence of DRS is demonstrated only 
for public hospitals (21 LHA-hospitals and the two hospital trusts). 
 In general, we can conclude that most of the hospitals in Veneto are too 
small in relation to their output levels (i.e. IRS). This problem of scale 
inefficiency, which is the first cause of the low total efficiency scores, 
characterises mainly the private hospitals (about 80% of the total of private 
DMUs: 14 for profit and five non-profit)15, while only 39% of the LHA-
public hospitals (23 DMUs) exhibit a sub-optimal size. This result indicates 
the particular role of private hospitals within the Veneto health care system: 
these hospitals are considered important within regional health care 
planning, as providers of supplementary services integrating public supply, 
even though they operate at a sub-optimal scale16. 
 Table 3 also reports internal efficiency scores obtained with model 4 and 
demand inefficiency levels, that is, the second component of external 
inefficiency determined by an excess supply with respect to expressed 
demand. Including an exogenous demand variable among the inputs has a 
noticeably positive impact on the efficiency scores, especially for many 
LHA-public hospitals (37 DMUs) and for some accredited private hospitals 
(nine for-profit and five non-profit) which can be considered as 
                                                 
15 For one non-profit and six for-profit hospitals, inefficiency depends only on an 
inefficient scale. 
16 The previous conclusion is confirmed by considering the relationships between the level 
of scale inefficiency and hospital size, measured in terms of number of beds: the higher 
scale inefficiency is linked to IRS and to a small capacity. Out of the 28 hospitals with scale 
inefficiency above the average (i.e. above 11.8%), 25 show IRS and 20 have less than 200 
beds. In contrast, only three units with scale inefficiency above the average have more than 
200 beds and show DRS. 
  22
complementary to public services and which operate under the strict control 
of regional and local health authorities.17  
 External inefficiency (measured by eIj- ej), due to non-optimal scale 
and/or to exogenous demand, is the only component of total inefficiency for 
34 hospitals (22 public). Therefore, we can conclude that, for these DMUs, 
low total efficiency scores can be better explained by past decisions made 
by policy-makers concerning the size of the hospital or its role within the 
regional health care service. 
 Table 4 reports the results of OLS regression analysis for six different 
measures of hospital inefficiency: 1) increased inefficiency due to the 
introduction of a restriction on the virtual weights of y1; 2) scale 
inefficiency; 3) demand inefficiency; 4) external inefficiency (given by the 
sum of scale and demand inefficiency); 5) internal inefficiency; 6) total 
inefficiency (given by the sum of internal and external inefficiency). The 
explanatory variables used in each regression are: 
• four dummy variables representing the type of any single hospital (LHA-
public, hospital trust, non-profit private, for-profit private). The first 
dummy - LHA-public hospitals - is considered a constant. Therefore, the 
estimated coefficients for the others should be interpreted as shifts from 
the average efficiency level of LHA-public hospitals observed for each of 
the other three types of hospital; 
• the number of beds; 
• the case-mix index, to account for the complexity of discharges; 
• the rotation index (number of patients that use one bed in a year, 
calculated as the ratio between the total number of discharges and the 
number of beds), to account for the rate of utilisation of hospital capacity. 
 
                                                 
17 14 hospitals become fully efficient moving from model 3 (scale efficiency) to model 4 
(internal efficiency). Among these hospitals, eight units exhibit a demand inefficiency 
index (eIj- eSj) higher than 10%: five LHA-public hospitals; two non-profit private hospitals 
and one for-profit hospital. As might be expected, all these DMUs are located in 
mountainous and/or low population density areas. 
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Table 4 – Parametric evaluation of different components of DEA 
inefficiency (*) 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
 
Regressors 
(1) 
Increased 
inefficiency 
due to 
restrictions 
on  y1  
(2) 
Scale 
inefficiency
 
(3) 
Demand 
inefficiency
 
(4) 
External 
inefficiency
 
(5) 
Internal 
inefficiency 
 
(6) 
Total 
inefficiency
 
4.51722 84.3339 4.04702 88.381 48.4443 136.825 Constant – LHA 
public hospitals 0.480131 5.46459 0.378639 5.2102 2.67096 7.23857 
11.4828 13.0752 -5.15282 7.92233 -3.555 4.36734 Dummy-Hospital 
Trusts 1.23608 1.42074 -0.80844 0.783178 -0.32868 0.387449 
-4.65297 8.62623 2.92939 11.5556 0.349079 11.9047 Dummy-Non-Profit 
Private hospitals -1.52156 1.71443 0.840641 2.08945 0.059033 1.93174 
-6.92871 10.867 -3.11643 7.75055 -7.99911 -0.24857 Dummy-For-profit 
Private Hospitals -3.12676 2.97552 -1.2321 1.93075 -1.86366 -0.05557 
-0.006.51 - - - - - Number of beds 
-1.62938      
9.47797 -54.4037 8.38364 -46.0201 -24.2709 -70.2910 Case-mix index 
1.10406 -3.9579 0.880649 -3.04595 -1.50242 -4.1751 
-0.2774 -0.79737 -0.2786 -1.07596 -0.49686 -1.57282 Rotation index 
-3.3897 -6.00593 -3.02994 -7.37327 -3.18436 -9.67235 
 
Adjusted R squared 0.191423 0.467729 0.125271 0.495009 0.077162 0.578027 
F statistic (zero) 4.31437 15.7629 3.40595 17.4679 2.4047 24.013 
(*) T-statistic in italics 
 
 
The estimation results in Table 4 show that: 
• the number of beds is significant only to explain the increased 
inefficiency due to the imposition of a restriction on the virtual weights 
of y1; 
• the growth of inefficiency due to the introduction of the weight 
restriction is lower when hospitals are private, with a large number of 
beds and a high rotation index; the high significance of the dummy for–
profit private hospitals is not surprising, since outputs y2 and y3 are less 
important in the production process of these hospitals; 
• a high rotation index is associated with a significant reduction in all the 
types of inefficiency; in any case, the growth of the rotation index 
produces a relatively lower impact on limiting the inefficiency 
determined by weight restrictions, since the DMUs with the virtual 
weight of y1 over 70% are characterised by a higher bed rotation; 
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• coeteris paribus, increasing the intensity of care, as measured by the 
case-mix index, significantly reduces the levels both of total technical 
inefficiency and of external scale inefficiency; 
• compared to LHA-public hospitals, non-profit private hospitals exhibit a 
higher total inefficiency; moreover, both non-profit and, especially, for-
profit hospitals are characterised by higher levels of scale inefficiency. 
 These results partially confirm the findings of many DEA models 
showing that public provision of hospital services exhibits in general less 
inefficiency than private provision (for a survey of these empirical studies, 
see Hollingsworth et al., 1999).18 In the case of hospitals in Veneto the 
relatively lower inefficiency exhibited by LHA-public hospitals depends 
mainly on the greater complexity of their case-mix (accounted for by output 
y1), while accredited private hospitals, whose role in Veneto is often 
complementary to public services, deal especially with long-term and low 
complexity in-patient care which is characterised by DRG tariffs above 
actual costs. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 The paper examines two possible directions of refinement of the DEA as 
a method for evaluating the relative technical efficiency of acute hospitals: 
1) the adoption of a constrained DEA, with restrictions on output (and/or 
input) weights, which tightens the unbounded hospital production possibility 
set according to the value judgements of health care policy-makers; 2) the 
consideration of VRS and of a supplementary “demand” input in DEA in 
order to distinguish between internal (managerial) and external (political) 
responsibility for technical inefficiency. 
 First of all, since hospital services operating within an NHS are generally 
given high social value, hospital technical efficiency should be evaluated in 
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relation to the preferences expressed by local and/or national communities 
through their elected representatives. For DEA, this means imposing 
constraints on input and output weights that are consistent with the 
preferences of the relevant policy-maker. Weight restrictions are based on 
modifications of the basic unbounded DEA model, in order to incorporate 
value judgements in the assessment of efficiency without eliminating a 
certain flexibility (freedom) vis-à-vis the value attached by hospitals to 
input and output variables. 
 Secondly, we have shown how the assumption of VRS and the inclusion 
of a demand variable among the inputs of the DEA model permit 
identification of how much inefficiency is due to factors outside the control 
of hospital management, such as past political decisions determining excess 
production capacity in relation to actual demand. 
 Based on these theoretical considerations, we have analysed the relative 
technical efficiency of hospitals in Veneto by using four models of DEA. 
Firstly, we find that the imposition of a lower bound of 70% on the virtual 
weight of acute care discharges weighted by case-mix (in order to 
encapsulate regional government objectives) reduces average efficiency 
from 74.5% to 71.3%; in fact, 25 hospitals worsen their efficiency levels 
because they attach too much importance to other outputs, such as day 
hospital care and emergency treatment.  
 Then, by assuming VRS and considering the impact of non-controllable 
demand on hospital efficiency, we show that, in many cases, low efficiency 
scores are attributable to external factors, which are not fully controlled by 
the hospital management. The problem of scale inefficiency characterises 
mainly the private hospitals (about 80% of the total of private hospitals 
exhibits increasing returns to scale), while only 39% of the LHA-public 
hospitals (23 DMUs) exhibits a sub-optimal size. The second source of 
                                                                                                                            
18 A recent work by Steinmann and Zweifel (2003) on the level of inefficiency of Swiss 
hospitals finds that private hospitals do not seem to be significantly less inefficient than 
public ones. The two authors remark that this result may be caused by the over-use of 
inputs (valued as amenities by patients) by private hospitals and they point out that this 
represents an important limitation in applying the purely quantitative criteria of DEA to 
hospitals. 
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external inefficiency (the shortage of demand) is important for many LHA-
public hospitals (37 DMUs) and for some accredited private hospitals (nine 
for-profit and five non-profit). In general, for 34 hospitals (22 public) 
external inefficiency is the only component of total inefficiency. For these 
DMUs, low total efficiency scores can be mainly explained by past policy-
makers’ decisions on the size of the hospitals or their role within the 
regional health care service.  
 Finally, non-profit private hospitals exhibit a level of total inefficiency 
higher than LHA-public hospitals; moreover, both non-profit and for-profit 
hospitals are characterised by higher levels of scale inefficiency than public 
ones. 
 Despite some limitations of the empirical analysis (due to the lack of 
information on out-patient services and on quality of hospital care), this 
paper represents a preliminary attempt to adapt the DEA method to the 
particular features of the hospital sector. It analyses the implications of 
modifying the basic DEA model in order to consider the impact on the 
measurement of hospital performance of both demand variables and policy-
maker objectives to be pursued via specific restrictions on weights. Both 
these changes have noteworthy policy implications. Firstly, since 
measurement of hospital relative efficiency with DEA should be based on 
particular value judgements, the evaluation process of productive 
performance should be transparent, with an explicit definition of restrictions 
on input and output weights according to policy-makers’ choices. These 
restrictions are crucial for specification of the DEA model in which the 
policy-makers should be involved, directly or indirectly. Secondly, the 
adoption of corrective actions aimed at increasing efficiency requires a 
distinction to be made between internal and external inefficiency. In fact, 
reducing the two types of inefficiency calls for different interventions: at 
hospital management level (for internal efficiency) or at health care 
planning authority level (for external efficiency). 
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 Since there is no all-purpose method for considering the influence of 
demand and for translating policy-maker objectives into restrictions on 
weights, these could be fruitful areas of development for future research. 
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